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SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
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PETITION FOR REHEARING

EN BANK REVIEW
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SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
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1. Petitioners Coombs and Burge, appellants, sui Juris apply Rule 31 for Petition for Rehearing and Rule 2 to prevent any further injustice to the appellants. The equity attributes of Rule 2 are hereby invoked to suspend that part of Rule 31 mandating that 2 [two] "members" of the Bar be sought out and joined by certification to give their stamp of approval to Petitioners private cause of action before this court. Such a requirement is improper and an unconstitutional condition precedent to petitioners rights to remedy and recourse to any injury proved by appellants pleadings and records. Such an extemporaneous "condition" causative to review a non existent "decision" purportedly issued out by this court is superfluous and premature as no facts or law are of record available for any such review. Further, had appellants desired the privilege and added expense to retain outside private Bar counsel they would have done so from the outset of this matter. Article I section 18, of the North Carolina constitution states " All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him, ****shall have a remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay."

2. Still again at Article IV Section 13 of the North Carolina Constitution it states, "No Rule of Procedure or practice shall abridge substantive rights. The right to a remedy to balance a wrong is a substantive right. Half way through a civil action to require Petitioners, in order to proceed, to seek a closed shop union bar member's certification favor is discriminatory and an impermissible condition precedent to, the achievement of our effort to seek equal justice and our remedy pursuant to the protections afforded pursuant to Article I section 18 above. Petitioners have proved themselves capable at every stage of the Administrative and appellate process. We have complied with all manner of reasonable form and substance and now simply request that this court perform its oversight function and Rule on the merits of the controversy squarely before your justices. The case we are advancing is quite possibly the largest revenue related utility case in this courts history. The charges we are contesting would ultimately have a national as well as state wide impact. Out of approximately 100 Million phone customers nationwide only two 2, [your petitioners] have done the legal research necessary to verify the impropriety and unlawfulness of current telephone charges in dispute. Let us not forget that many telephone subscribers complain vehemently about rising telephone costs an numerous unnecessary charges but lack the motivation and legal skills necessary to do anything about it. Admittedly, still others are totally oblivious of the schemes robbing their monies due to hidden administrative slight of hand. However, why should our case[ NOW ]be subjected to a non peer review by individuals who, if they had the knowledge, would have themselves raised the subject matter for review. In fact, the Public Utilities Commission own staff, both public and private lawyers, did not themselves uncover the unjustifiableness of the current charges in dispute;

so where is this implied special knowledge and competence implicitly being advanced in the requisite requirements of Rule 31? If the thousands of Bar Lawyers in North Carolina possessed some special measure or greater sense of knowledge or abilities relative to the facts to the case at Bar, they would have themselves brought a similar action for themselves or another client. The mere fact that we find no such representative "filing" anywhere upon the public records of North Carolina; only goes to establish persuasive evidence that Bar Lawyers do not possess any "superior knowledge or capability" necessarily being summoned by that requirement of "review" contained in Rule 31. That "condition" at least in this instance, appears to be no more than a matter of prior restraint and monopoly of access to justice rather than judicial expediency. Why, in this case, would any two Bar attorneys be called upon to "certify" error/s in the Ex Mero Motu Order where "no law or statement of fact" has issued from this courts Order? We request a rehearing, specifically to supply the missing causation that has prompted this court to dismiss our action! There is "nothing" for these two bar counsel to review as we are seeking the substance and dicta upon which this court has proceeded. We cannot cite with specificity because you have provided none to us. This is what we now seek with our petition for Rehearing.

3. Petitioners Coombs and Burge take vociferous exception and objection to the conference decision issued out of this Court the eleventh Day of February, 2000. This case, "is" a Rate Case by the simple and clear words of definition contained within N.C.G.S. 62-2(24).

First off, A case is " any proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or Equity", {Black's 7th pg 206}, and a <"rate"> per N.C.G.S. 62-2(24) is "every compensation, charge.....collected by any public utility, ***". These definitions make it crystal clear and not subject to reinterpretation that the charges in controversy are in fact and law, Rate charges; which if improper as we contend, will significantly impact both the overall revenues and rate of return of both AT&T and Sprint. How anyone can read the English language otherwise is beyond all rational reasoning. Yet as best we can discern, albeit we have "no" statements of fact or Law to prove otherwise, the Order of this court dated February 15, 2000 was predicated on the opinion that our filing is not worthy of its "Rate case classification". The clear Agency regulation defined above, belies the current Order of this Court, and we request clarification by way of rehearing to expound on the facts supporting a "non Rate Case" determination.

4. Your Order states; "Under consideration of the Direct Appeal from Administrative Agency as Rate Case Under N.C.G.S. 7A-29,* * * the following order was entered * * * Dismissed ex mero motu by order of the Court in conference, this 3rd day of February 2000."

5. The error of the court is that there is " no substantive decision", thereby rendering any further adjudication and investigation on the merits a factual impossibility. This court is abusing petitioners in exactly the same manner and way that the Utilities Commission did below, by not providing any substance of fact or Law to take issue on. We exercise the "appeal as of right" under G.S. 7A-29 because the administrative agency failed in it's duty to comply with N.C.G.S.62-73 by first giving "consideration of our complaint" and then "providing an opportunity to be heard"; violated its own Rules and denied us a mandated Hearing which was preliminarily set and then abruptly canceled without cause. This series of events gave rise to our appeal pursuant to App.Rule 18, "appeal as of right" to this court for lack of due process and remedy. It seems that this court is violating its own admitted policy contained at Appellate Rule 9 (g), wherein this court requires sufficient statements of fact and conclusions of law to allow a reviewing court to form a basis of an opinion. Absent any substantive information and chronology of legal reasoning, the appellants are left wanting in any fact or law to present to a higher reviewing tribunal from which to take issue. These appellants deserve as a matter of law a competent and worthy judicial opinion, so constructed, that if we proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court there would be some basis upon which that Court would be able to take jurisdiction and render out a meaningful review.

6. The current Order of this court directly denies the petitioners any substance and record for further review of their actions. This denies us due process and an opportunity to move forward.

7. Further we object to the action of this court to date to wit: Our objections and exceptions are based on the simple fact that the Appellees received the Appeal Brief and Record on Appeal on December 16, 2000. Rule 18 (d) (2) states that appellees had 35 days to file an objection to the record on Appeal and they did not. Therefore, pursuant to law, the Appellants Record on Appeal constitutes the Record. Rule 13 (a) states the appellees had 30 days in which to file their responsive brief. That 30 days tolled on January 16, 2000.

8. This court was then bound by the "operation of law", to entertain either a Default application or as we opted for, a Judgement in Nihil Dicit. The Moving Party has the obligation to advance the proceeding. The Appellants gave notice to this Court January 22, 2000, that Appellate Rule 15 had not being complied with and that Appellants were now moving forward to take a compulsory remedy, and included the green card receipts evidencing the Appellees were out of time in filing, Exhibit A. On February 2, 2000 we again notified this Court and all parties that Appellants were moving for a Nihil Dicit Judgement as the matter had ripened into a matter of strict operation of law, which this Court must recognize. Exhibit B.

9. On February 7, 2000, appellants did enter said Nihil Dicit Judgement.

10. At that point in time, January 16, 2000, the strict operation of law took over and controlled the proceeding. The mere fact that the representatives of the Utility carriers are silent should invoke this courts well established Maxim of law that silence is deemed affirmance, in the lack of a clear duty to respond.

11. Since the United States General Accounting office has offered documentary testimony consistent with our pleadings, this alone should be prima facie illustrative that someone out there forgot their defense case; and it just so happens to be the parties who failed to join action!

12. Mr. Justices, we admit that our communication lacks the tack that you probably are used to reading, but quite frankly Sirs, hard work and nicety has gotten us nothing to date but cop outs and bureaucratic double speak. I insert a statement here by the Supreme Court to wit: Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289-290, wherein Justice Frankfurter stated,

"Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions . . . Judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt".

13. Finally, Mr justices, to save us all time and to cut to the chase as that slang goes, if your tribunal categorically feels that we are without legal standing or jurisdiction either to bring this action or to be properly before your court - please SAY SO !

14. If we do not have REMEDY in your courts than please remember, a court without a remedy is really no court at all! Its really that simple. Lets put the cards on the table, if your authority is solely founded in Leiber Code Conquest Rule of Necessity, please place that fact upon the record so that the people will know.

15. We frankly have other things to do than pretend that we are dealing with any just laws and determinative justice, where such apparently, is not the case.

16. Are we being governed simply by NECESSITY with all effort being to protect the belligerents of conquest and their associative corporations or is there really any Law out there to rely on ?

17. Finally, as to your dismissal of my motion for Mr. Burge as Intervener/Appellant: Paul Burge has every right to intervene in the PUC case and to date has been denied that right. PUC Rules and regulations state at Rule R1-19(d) Intervention "Leave to intervene filed within the time provided in compliance with this rule and showing a real interest in the subject matter of the proceeding will be granted as a matter of course, ***" This regulation has really three elements. (1)" Filed within the time provided" -which in R1-19(b) is within 10 days prior to a CALL TO HEARING. Since this case has never been granted a bona fide call to hearing date, this condition is satisfied.

(2){a} "and showing a real interest in the subject matter" - Mr Burge stated in his original petition to Intervene among other facts: at (9) that he shares a financial interest in the very same categories of charges in dispute. These unauthorized and improper telephone charges emanate in fact from the very same two Utility companies as named Respondents. Since Mr, Burge undoubtedly is charged the very same types of charges that are the subject matter of the P-89 Sub 69 he unquestionably has a financial interest in this action. In fact, every phone user in the country has the very same financial interest as do I and Mr. Burge.

2{b} Mr. Burge has raised the issue of "estoppel". A timely filing of a valid claim eliminates the invocation of that "bar" from ever becoming an issue

2{c} Mr. Burge is a trained Paralegal certified at the very top of his graduation class. He has stated of record that he has conducted his own independent investigation and legal research into the subject matter of this action. I can state categorically this statement is true, since I have worked almost from day one with Mr, Burge and in fact he has reviewed my research and I his from the outset. All Briefs and Records filed are a result of our joint efforts and work product. To suggest, even for a second, that Mr. Burge does not have a direct interest in this matter is an absurdity beyond belief!

In fact, Mr Burge is well aware of the fact that he can, if he wishes, turn right around and file the exact same paperwork back into the PUC and start the process all over again as filed. He would have every right to so do since he has done much of the same research and is intimately familiar with the issues.

He purposely wanted to be considerate of this courts time as well as the commissions, by simply "joining" per App. R 28(f) in this action and thereby eliminating the duplicity that otherwise would result.

(3)"in compliance with this rule" - Mr Burge is in full compliance with this Rule which items of form are stated in R1-19(a)(1-3)- even down to the matter of form which requires that each item be numbered. So, in conclusion, having complied precisely with the regulation paragraph (d) says that Intervention will be GRANTED as a matter of "course". That word [course ] is not defined within the regulation so we will give it its commonly accepted interpretation with some help from Blacks 7th. [Course] of dealing. " an established pattern of conduct between parties to a particular transaction".[ Blks 7-pg 356 ] [Course.] "as in course of events" [Oxford International Dict ] Since Mr. Burge has complied with all listed requirements of the regulation.....the result granted is ...according to the regulation...matter of "course" involvement in the events arising out of the conduct represented.

18. Since Mr. Burge is engaged in the very same business transaction with the Respondent telephone companies as am I, and since he is contesting the very same types of charges as am I, and since his "injury" is the same type as outlined in P-89 Sub 69, every conceivable justification has been met for him to have Intervention and direct interest in the successful prosecution of this matter.

19. Mr Burge is entitled as a matter of Law and Regulation to full joinder and Intervention in order to protect his independent property interests.

CONCLUSION

20. The failure of this Court to invoke the nihil dicit judgement is a direct violation of "operation of Law," a travesty of justice, a denial of due process, a denial of a remedy, and a denial of Equal Justice under Law, all in violation of Rights and Privileges expounded upon in the Constitution of North Carolina and statutes promulgated there under.

21. It is with this Petition that appellants seek a rehearing En Banc so the court can reverse it's previous Orders that were deficient as well as in error and grant the nihil dicit judgement already decided by course of law. "We the undersigned declare the foregoing Record on Appeal, records, brief, documents, letters,and this Petition for ReHearing, all submissions in their entirety to be the truth as I verily believe, to the best of my knowledge under the penalty of PERJURY, so help us GOD."

Sincerely presented

Albert Coombs, Sui Juris

Paul Burge, Sui Juris