|
"Those who say it cannot be done should not interfere with those of us who are doing it"© - S. Hickman
| Home Against the Grain Livid Leigh Boilin' Ed D. Tom The Informer Knowledge is Freedom Privacy Links Court Case Contact Us |
© 1994 - 2007
|
Court Case of Importance
|
CASE NO.:00-6105 IN THE ARTICLE III
Albert Coombs and Paul Burge vs. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LP, and
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
Albert Coombs, Sui Juris Paul
Burge, Sui Juris
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 1. Petitioners maintain that Respondents have "Forfeited and Defaulted" any Right or Privilege to enter a response in this Forum, does this court agree? 2. A. Does the North Carolina Supreme Court lack jurisdiction to preside over International treaty law? We maintain they DO NOT have such jurisdiction; so were Petitioners denied the required element of proper NOTICE within the 1996 Telecommunications Act; since nowhere within this document is this disclosure made apparent? B. Therefore, did the North Carolina Supreme Court abdicate its constitutional obligation to " Do substantial Justice" when it denied Petitioners any statements of Fact or Law; in its Ex Mero Motu decision without "any" comment whatsoever, when Civil Rule of Procedure # 52(a)[1]and[2] specifically declares such SHALL be done when Petitioners requested same? #3. Did both the PUC and NC Sup. Ct commit Fraud, wherein Petitioners relied on a series of statutes and regulations to their legal detriment; due to lack of FULL DISCLOSURE of relevant fact matter; regarding the legal genesis for said statutes and regulations; such information which could and should be disclosed in the body of the statute and corresponding regulation so as to provide "notice" of necessary foundation matter that it was instituted by a international treaty based agency, the FCC? #4 [A]. Did the abrupt cancellation of the scheduled N.C.G.S. 62-3(24) "rate" HEARING and the corresponding DISMISSAL of our action denying the "Discovery" which the Law says we are entitled; cut off any foreseeable REMEDY to Petitioners BECAUSE our action was about to "ripen" into an accusatory pleading AGAINST the P.U.C itself? Therefore "absent" said Administrative remedy , Petitioner/s are continuing to be forced to pay [ give up their property] contrary to Law and against their will and wishes: [B]. Is this a violation of the 13th Article to the Constitution? [C]. Or in the alternative, is this a violation of the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS at Article 4, to wit: " No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." #5. [A]. Did the Supreme Court of North Carolina allow international treaty law to override North Carolina Constitution Art IV Sect 12(1), as the FCC, an agency under international treaty law per 48 Stat. 1064 instituting the charges complained, in place of the prohibitions proscribed in the Constitution and the Articles of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing the Fundamental Rights of Petitioners shall not be abrogated? #6. (A). Plaintiff/appellant/s allege and have submitted proof in the form of "the" repealing statute and Regulations that the so called EXCISE phone tax has been terminated effective July 1, 1965 under 26 CFR and repealed effective June 28, 1968; does the Supreme court concur in our issue of Law? (B). Does the Supreme court concur that the 1898 Excise tax law, as written only applies to the owners and operators of the telephone companies and not to the consumer/users under strict statutory construction principles of Law ? #7. Are Plaintiff/appellant(s) correct in that the 911, NC Relay and NC state tax statutes, under strict Constitutional construction, fails for "improper ENACTING clause" pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution at Article II, Section 21, and are therefore void statutes? #8. From the beginning the Public Utilities Commission [P.U.C.] the General Counsel for that Agency has maintained that our Complaint to that Agency DID NOT QUALIFY as a "rate" case, and therefore they proceeded to deny the requisite hearing and required Administrative review required by statute for such cases. Petitioners, on the other hand, disagree; and
offer the following "proof" that our complaint does satisfy the definition
{ as best one can discern } of that category of "rate" status cases
and deserves to be treated accordingly. #9. Did the Public Utilities Commission (P.U.C.) unjustly deny "intervener" status to Paul Burge?
PARTIES TO THE ACTION BELOW Plaintiffs Below Albert Coombs Paul
Burge Defendants Below Sprint Mid-Atlantic Telecom Inc and Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company AT&T
iii
Petition Appendix #1 Petition Appendix #2 Petition Appendix #3 Petition Appendix #4 Appendix #5
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
OPINIONS BELOW When the North Carolina Public Utilities denied Discovery and canceled the hearing it had set they issued a dismissal attached as Petition Exhibit #1. Plaintiff's appealed to the North Carolina State Supreme Court which dismissed Ex Mero Motu attached as Petition Exhibit #2. Petitioner's then moved for a rehearing which was also dismissed by Amended Order dated May 30, 2000, which is attached as Petition Exhibit #3.
JURISDICTION
The date on which the highest State court dismissed the case was March 2, 2000. A copy of that dismissal appears at Petition Exhibit #2. A timely Petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date May 30, 2000, and a copy of that Order appears at Petition Exhibit #3. An extension of time was filed with this Court but was not needed and paperwork returned when it was found the amended Order did not issue until May 30, 2000 and a copy of the letter from the clerk of the one supreme Court is attached as Petition Exhibit #4. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Art.1, Sect.8; and Art.III Sect.2 of Constitution for the united States of America; and also authorized by Petitioner's under Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED North Carolina Constitution Article IV, Section 12, Paragraph 1 North Carolina Statutory provisions involved 7A-29(b) U.S. Statutory Provisions involved Statutes at Large, March, 1897 To 1899, Vol. XXX, Fifty-Fifth Congress, Statutes at Large of the 1939 Income Tax, Pub. L. 90-364, title I, Sec.105 (b) (3), P.L. 104-458 1996 Telecommunications act Senate Report 93-549 Forty-eight Congress, Second Session 1889 45 Stat. 2760
STATEMENT OF THE CASE and HISTORY Petitioners are not private bar members nor lawyers. They are functioning as Sui Juris, as of Right and NOT pro se, as of privilege. The
and such. The United States Supreme Court has held that non-lawyer pleadings should be liberally construed in non-lawyers favor. HUGHES V ROWE, FOR 49 U.S. 5 (1980); ESTELLE V GAMBLE, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) REH DENIED, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); HAINES V KERNER, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); BOAG V MACDOUGAL, 5454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982). "Even under heightened pleading requirements, the [Petitioner] is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for the claim, only the facts underlying it". MCCALDEN V CALIFORNIA LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, 919 F 2d 538, 546 (9th Circuit 1990); See also CABRERA V MARTIN, 973 F 2d 735 (9th Circuit 1990). Although this is not hand written, the following applies. "The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, "however in artfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)." ESTELLE V GAMBLE, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) Since this case has been so convoluted by the agency and the Court below and because neither the Agency nor the SUPREME COURT has provided a single statement of fact or Law to comprise a transcript that Petitioners can offer this Court we are inserting herein as Appendix #5, the entire Administrative Record of Appeal to this Court as the statement of the history of the case. It contains all the information needed with indexes, table of contents, table of authorities , etc., etc. as required below which parrots this Courts criteria. Petitioners are proceeding " Sui Juris"; rather than Pro Se, and firmly believe that "Equal Justice" would dictate the same "liberal" standards will be accorded our submissions; due to our non officer of the court status. It would be utterly confusing to rehash all proceedings to date or endeavor to "manufacture" a non existent transcript from 176 pages of Plaintiff's record. The Defendants have entered nothing in the record at the Public Utilities Commission except blanket denials with no proofs. This is an express violation of P.U.C. Rule R-1(9)(e)- which dictates the requirements of "Answers." Petitioners TOOK a Nil Dicit DEFAULT JUDGEMENT against RESPONDENTS which the NC Supreme Court refused to honor; this issue is also before your Court. Because of this; technically, Respondents LOST this case at the appellate level. Petitioners cite what happened very briefly and anything spoken here is available in the Record of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Starting July, 1998, letters were filled for six months with Defendants complaining of charges that were not constitutional and illegal charges in the {studied opinion} of Petitioner, after his legal research uncovered same. Petitioner contacted the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in December of 1998 and they advised I file a formal complaint, which was filed only against Sprint Mid-Atlantic. The PUC decided it had jurisdiction and added AT&T to the complaint and served it on both Defendants. The General Accounting Office submitted their opinion, B-278820 Feb. 10, 1998, on January 14, 1999, that the charges were non constitutional as the FCC had not been granted authority by Congress to allow the Defendants to make these kinds of charges. In May 1999, at the request of Petitioner Coombs, a hearing was set by the PUC in August of 1999. Petitioner could not file for discovery according to the North Carolina Rules UNTIL a hearing was set. An Intervenor, Paul Burge, entered according to the PUC Rules, before Petitioner Coombs filed for discovery. Within a week of the entry of Discovery the PUC had disallowed the service of Discovery upon the Defendants, because all paperwork went through the PUC between the parties. Then the PUC abruptly canceled the Hearing set certain, and dismissed the complaint and therefore correspondingly denied the Intervener status to Paul Burge. A show cause was entered against PUC and was never answered. Intervener Burge then filed an Appeal to his denial, which was never responded to by PUC. A petition for rehearing was also denied. PUC sent complaint to Atty. General, who stated he did not have the man power to investigate. Petitioners moved and filed under North Carolina General Statutes and the Constitution which stated that the case was a direct Appeal of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina Supreme Court docketed the case. After 30 days expired and the Defendants never entered a paper in defense, Petitioners filed a Notice with the Defendants and the Court that they were going for a Nihil Dicit judgement because of default. Four days later, after hearing nothing from Defendants, or the Court, Petitioners filed a Nihil Dicit Judgement. The Court chose to ignore the fact of default and Petitioners Nihil Dicit Judgement and dismissed Ex Mero Motu with no statements of facts or conclusions of law. A rehearing was petitioned and the court was asked to provide reasons for denial under the appropriate Rules of the Courts of North Carolina. The court denied the rehearing without comment or reasons. The Petitioners thereafter filed a timely Appeal to this Court. Petitioners requested an extension of time to this court and while doing so discovered that the North Carolina Supreme Court had made an error in its Order such that Petitioners could not file the order the Clerk of the one supreme Court wanted, as he sent it back asking for the order which was being "revised". The North Carolina Supreme Court had to amend their Order on May 30, 2000. This was then sent to the Clerk of the one supreme Court and a letter issued (Exhibit #4) from the one supreme Court clerk stating that an extension of time was not needed because the 90 day time tolled from May 30, 2000 and Petitioners could reserve the 60 day extension if needed at a later date.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION Reason No. 1 The Defendants never even entered the forum at the North Carolina Supreme Court level to defend the Appeal, therefore there is nothing but the Petitioner's Record of Appeal to go by. It matters not the jurisdiction, but whether this Court will "grant or "Deny" a REMEDY? American case Law states: "for EVERY "wrong" there MUST BE a "Remedy". Therefore, this court must, as a matter of right, grant Cert.. Petitioners have shown that they have a right to a remedy to issue from this Court that was improperly denied by the North Carolina Supreme Court. However, the Defendant phone companies have no right to appear before this Court in any form or fashion having defaulted that privilege when failing to show and defend in the North Carolina Supreme Court. Should this Court now grant them that privilege it would show extreme bias and favor for their private bar members. Reason No. 2. The entire argument supporting the answer to A and B is that only the United States Supreme court can hear a treaty case concerning the FCC charges by the phone companies whom answer to an international treaty created agency, the FCC. However the other charges concerning the federal Excise tax that is improperly applied, arguendo even if it was not repealed, lies with the North Carolina Supreme Court, but now is before this Court on default of the North Carolina Supreme Court. The U.S. Constitution does not grant power to Congress to control telecommunications as they are doing with the Gore and other taxes except, they can apply an excise tax. For telecommunications, the International Radio Convention, 45 Stat. 2760, was adopted by the U.S. Senate on March 21, 1928, and a second International Radio Convention, 49 Stat. 2392, followed thereafter on December 9, 1932. On June 19, 1934, Congress adopted the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, which created the Federal Communications Commission. Thus, the F.C.C. is a treaty based, federal agency which implement treaties our nation has ratified with other countries and therefore they have an international jurisdiction. Therefore, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina also dismissed Ex Mero Motu, without reason when asked, it denied substantial justice when hiding all Appeal charge dismissal under treaty law. The North Carolina Rules of Court, Civil Procedure specifically states at Rule 52(a) [1] and [2] "(a)Findings. (1) In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon and direct the entry of appropriate judgement. The Defendant phone companies never presented any evidence of facts or law in answering the PUC complaint to substantiate their position. Petitioners believe to do so, would show the law they were actually operating under. This explains why the discovery, that asked this very question, was denied and Hearing set aside and repudiated. The Defendant phone companies never joined issue at the NC Supreme Court - never filed a single paper in rebuttal, completely defaulted their case in chief in North Carolina to contest the Appeal. The Supreme Court dismissal is fraud at it's highest when the very State agency and Court designed to protect the people from these international laws never indicate that the law in question goes four corner's square against the Constitution that people think protects them from the abuses of international created agencies dictating a law foreign to people's belief. This fraud was carried to extremes when used as a cover to deny remedy to Petitioners in other matters of the phone charges that are not treaty based. The supreme Court in Morris v State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, stated, "That any time a constitutional question is placed before a court and the court either refuses to answer or answers erroneously then it denies constitutional rights." Also, it was "ruled" in US vs Tweel, 550 F2d 297, 299, 300, that when a public servant is asked a question they have a moral duty to answer and if they do not - it is equated with fraud!!! Fraud is crime and therein lies the criminal acts committed by even the North Carolina Supreme Court justices, to the man, in a conspiracy to deprive Petitioners of their property, and force them into involuntary servitude to a private public (a.k.a. government) utility operating under international treaty based agency of government, namely the FCC. Therefore, either the North Carolina Supreme court is bound strictly to the Constitution of the State and United States as a Union member, or it operates willy nilly when an International treaty organization shoves aside the constitution that allegedly was created by the people to prevent such injustices. The one supreme Court for the united States, under original jurisdiction of 1787 must__ow tell the people that the Constitution is either dead or alive and the people can or cannot depend on the Constitution to keep government and its agencies in check when they hide behind the 1783 treaty with the Crown, that controlled the 1787 Constitution but declared to all that the Constitution is supreme. The reason Petitioners want this to come to a head in this case and controversy, is a case found in North Carolina that supports the fact that treaty and treaty created agencies, such as the FCC, and not the Constitution rules supreme and why Congress does have to enact legislation to authorize the phone charges when treaty agreements rule supreme, see infra. To prove these treaties are supreme over the constitution, supposedly the "Law of the Land," here is what the HAMILTON v. EATON, 1 N.C. 641 (1796), HAMILTON v. EATON. 2 Mart., 1. U.S. Circuit Court. (June Term, 1796.), had to say. "Headnote 5. Besides, the treaty of 1783 was declared by
an Act of Assembly of this State passed in 1787, to be law in this State, and
this State by adopting the Constitution of the United States in 1789, declared
the treaty to be the supreme law of the land. The treaty now under consideration
was made, on the part of the United States, by a Congress composed of deputies
from each state, to whom were delegated by the articles of confederation, expressly,
"the sole and exclusive right and power of entering into treaties and alliances";
and being ratified and made by them, it became a complete national act, and
the act and law of every state. This is a situation that the government, and yes including this court, can keep the cake and eat it too, and the people are then forced into involuntary servitude to international interests forever with no recourse but to a court that can hear International arguments when the subject is brought forth such as Petitioners are doing now. As this Petitioner, Coombs, has contacted the Hague on the matter to bring before that International Court, that Court told Petitioner that only States, and no individual man can petition and bring a case such as this to the International Court of the Hague. Therefore, the one supreme Court For the united States has the authority to hear this case as the Petitioners authorize this Court to hear the matter since it is claimed that the ultimate arbitrators of the constitution are the people, not The one supreme Court, who created the constitutions in the first place for the government including this Court. Now this Court has to decide a extremely important division between the foregoing case of Hamilton v Eaton supra and the next case from your brethren's which has not been over turned or modified in any way. We emphasize that portion which is in conflict with Hamilton supra. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) SUTHERLAND, J., Opinion of the Court "And the Constitution itself is, in every real sense, a law -- the lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom, under our system, all political power and sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such power and sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the legislative, executive, and judicial agencies which it created exercise such political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution speaks for itself in terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. "We the people of the United States," it says, "do ordain and establish this Constitution . . ." Ordain and establish! These are definite words of enactment, and, without more, would stamp what follows with the dignity and character of law. The framers of the Constitution, however, were not content to let the matter rest here, but provided explicitly -- This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus declared without qualification. That supremacy is absolute; the supremacy of a statute enacted by Congress is not absolute, but conditioned upon its being made in pursuance of the Constitution. And a judicial tribunal, clothed by that instrument with complete judicial power, and, therefore, by the very nature of the power, required to ascertain and apply the law to the facts in every case or proceeding properly brought for adjudication, must apply the supreme law and reject the inferior statute [p*297] whenever the two conflict. In the discharge of that duty, the opinion of the lawmakers that a statute passed by them is valid must be given great weight, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 , 544 ; but their opinion, or the court's opinion, that the statute will prove greatly or generally beneficial is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry. Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , 549-550 . We have set forth, perhaps at unnecessary length, the foregoing principles, because it seemed necessary to do so in order to demonstrate that the general purposes which the act recites, and which, therefore, unless the recitals be disregarded, Congress undertook to achieve, are beyond the power of Congress except so far, and only so far, as they may be realized by an exercise of some specific power granted by the Constitution. Proceeding by a process of elimination which it is not necessary to follow in detail, we shall find no grant of power which authorizes Congress to legislate in respect of these general purposes unless it be found in the commerce clause -- and this we now consider." As noted by the courts ruling of law in Carter supra, the Constitution, it can be seen that they refer to Congress and its statutes, i.e. "In the discharge of that duty, the opinion of the lawmakers that a statute passed by them is valid must be given great weight." Now to further the fact that Congress was supposed to enact a statute to support the FCC treaty decree and did not, Petitioners use a Government document titled Treaties And Conventions concluded between the United States of America and Other Powers, Since July 4, 1776, printed as Senate Executive Document No. 47, Forty-eight Congress, Second Session 1889. This quote states it all. INTRODUCTORY NOTE "I. A Treaty, constitutionally concluded and ratified, abrogates all
State laws inconsistent therewith. It is the supreme law
of the land, subject. only to the provisions of the constitution.4 With that in mind, Congress has now failed in its duty and never "enacted" the "gore tax" portion complained, but rather it was the FCC international treaty created agency that did. Under United States Law, all general law making authority is restricted to the "Legislative Branch; and may not be redelegated. Therefore, the PUC and North Carolina Supreme Court was in criminal error to not rule in favor of Petitioners, since all attorneys involved, especially the justices of the Court know or should know constitutional prohibitions and see that they were not violated, as did Petitioners. This only shows what we stated in our arguments earlier that the North Carolina Court could Rule on the "Gore taxes" because they were not law at all but passed under the guise of law. Yet the State agencies hid behind an improper dismissal which settled nothing and cooperated and permitted an involuntary exaction of property (servitude)as per Treasury section 601.106 (F) (1) which stated, was a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and reviewer shall adhere ("hew") to the law. That law is the constitution, rather than statutes which are mere "color" of Law. REASON No. 3. (1) The PUC failed to allow my Discovery; said discovery which would have brought forth the actual source and nature of the law the phone companies were operating under in applying the "Gore Taxes" and Number portability charges; because THAT specific question was among my First Discovery requests". However, The PUC fearing we were "getting too close"; denied us Due Process by dismissing this opportunity, and Hearing which every litigant in a civil matter is entitled. (2) The North Carolina Supreme Court simply dismisses an Appeal of Right case from the PUC, with no statements of Facts or conclusions of law, yet it is mandated by the North Carolina Rules of Court to do so. Fraud: An
intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance
upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a
legal right. The definition of FRAUD given in 37
AM JUR 2nd, 144, 146 is: This crime was used against Petitioners to cover the fact that Congress never enacted any laws for these charges. All throughout the pleading Petitioners asked constantly for the parties to provide the genesis of the law they were using. The fact the FCC was created under International Treaty and is apparently applying international telecommunications charges absent Congressional enactment was hidden from all users and is why the PUC and the Supreme Court of North Carolina remained silent, furthering the fraud and becoming a part of it. There is no other argument necessary as all PUC and Court operatives concerned knew or should have known by the oaths they took, that they had an obligation and duty to supply the information requested by Petitioners, see fraud supra. REASON No.4 A. The simple argument here is denial of any "meaningful" due process which would grant remedy to petitioners and not one legal scholar would disagree. This is stated in one of the arguments in the lower PUC and as sub exhibit F-13, pages 34 and 35 of The Record of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. It is so basic a maxim of law it is written into the Treasury Department administrative code of Regulations to wit: Chapter 1 Internal Revenue Service--Department of the Treasury Part 601 Statement of Procedural Rules. Section 601.106 (f) (1) Rule I. An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or otherwise, is a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, an Appeals representative in his or her conclusions of fact or application of law, shall hew to the law and the recognized standards of legal construction." The facts show the PUC AND the North Carolina Supreme Court did not "hew" to the Constitutional parameters, that Congress and only Congress can enact such a law and they did not. They allowed a international treaty created agency, The FCC, to usurp the authority of Congress in violation of the Constitution and create the "Gore Taxes," as proven in the GAO Report. This is an exaction of Petitioners property since ONLY the Senate and NOT the House of Reps. sits upon Treaty matters when no enacted statute by Congress specifically allowed these charges. The Document of the General Accounting Office, an investigatory arm of Congress, evidences the fraud involved that indeed there was no enacted statute by Congress and the FCC violating the Corporations control Act in setting up the corporations to exact an unlawful charge, a tax, fee, whatever you want to call it, and use the phone companies as their agent, See Exhibit F pages 77 to 93 of Record of Appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. (B) This sham exaction creates another violation of the law of the Constitution and that is the Thirteenth Amendment. The cases Petitioners will cite are only two in number for we say, "Res Ipsa Loquitur." The State agencies, The PUC and the North Carolina Supreme Court, in forcing Petitioners to comply with non constitutional law by dismissing our controversy in violation of Due Process prohibitions of the Constitutions of State and Federal, have forced Petitioners into the involuntary servitude position prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment and the controlling cases on this are Clyatt v U.S., 197 U.S. 207 and Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191, 31 S. Ct. 145. This is what the Bailey Court had to say that supports our argument of involuntary servitude, "A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by creating a statutory presumption any more than by direct enactment; and a State cannot compel involuntary servitude in carrying out contracts of personal service by creating a presumption that the person committing the breach is guilty of intent to defraud merely because he fails to perform the contract." No contract, which I demanded be proffered, has been produced. No contract between the Defendant phone companies and petitioners exists. There is no enacted law by Congress, therefore a whole plethora of constitutional violations are present besides the ones we have stated herein, such as criminal Acts, conspiracy, among others; it is self apparent. So much so, that this Court MUST take "silent judicial notice" of crimes in progress; and take appropriate measure to prevent same from continuing. The judges "clerks" previewing this petition cannot deny "Notice of crime" on behalf of the Justices by simply recommending against granting "cert"; because as "agents" to the Court and the Justices individually; "Notice to Agent, is Notice to Principle". After reading this additional quote from Bailey, the controversy of peonage is - Res Ipsa Loquitur. "The words "involuntary servitude" have a larger meaning than slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited all control by coercion of the personal service of one man for the benefit of another. While the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing, Congress has power to secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation and the peonage act of March 2, 1867, and §§ 1990 and 5526, Rev. Stat., are valid exercises of this authority. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt is paid, and the fact that he contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the peonage acts. The Federal anti-peonage acts are necessarily violated by any state legislation which seeks to compel service or labor by making it a crime to fail or refuse to perform it. . . This has been so clearly stated by this court in the case of Clyatt, supra, that discussion is unnecessary. The court there said: "The constitutionality and scope of sections 1990 and 5526 present the first questions for our consideration. They prohibit peonage. What is peonage? It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. As said by Judge Benedict, delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. Mex. 190, 194: {*243} 'One fact existed universally; all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their masters' service.' Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service. We need not stop to consider any possible limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, or the obligations of a child to its parents, or of an apprentice to his master, or the power of the legislature to make unlawful and punish criminally an abandonment by an employee of his post of labor in any extreme cases. That which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt." 197 U.S. pp. 215, 216. Since the above establishes Petitioners are being subjected to the taking of property for the "benefit of another" against their will, and absent consent invokes in the Thirteenth Amendment to this case, which not only affects Petitioners but every American with a phone. Petitioners add to the above that there is no "provision of law" to "legally or lawfully" demand these charges compelled by the phone companies, who, are in quasi collusion with the FCC, the PUC and the North Carolina Supreme Court in a R.I.C.O., 18 USC 1961 to 1964 violation. There also is 18 USC 241 and 242 to consider as well as Larceny by fraud and deception as well as extortion; as this is all being done under the noses of Bar members who are presumed versed in the law and therefore cannot claim ignorance. Petitioner Coombs brought forth all these violations to the attention of Defendants before the filing of the PUC complaint, which was incorporated in the Complaint filed as sub exhibit I-1, pages 40 to 45; sub exhibit K-,1 pages 47 to 61, in the Record of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. B-1 Argument: From the FOREWORD of the U.S. Senate Report 93-549 we have the following statement of fact: "Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are now in effect four presidentially-proclaimed states of national emergency: In addition to the national emergency declared by President Roosevelt in 1933, there are also the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, during the Korean conflict, and the states of national emergency declared by President Nixon on March 23, 1970, and August 15, 1971. These proclamations give force to 470 provisions of Federal law. These hundreds of statutes delegate to the President extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised by the Congress, which affect the lives of American citizens in a host of all-encompassing manners. This vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal Constitutional processes" Since no statute has issued that revokes this declaration then the Constitution of 1787 which we "believed" to be in full force and effect; is suspect - especially in light of 12 USC 95 (a) and (b), which is current Law. [C] The Declaration of human Rights at Article 4, clearly applies to "everyone"; and states that: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." Further that document states as follows: "Whereas it is essential, if man is not to resort to rebellion against government that human rights should be protected by the rule of law and freedom should be secured. Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in their Charter reaffirmed this faith in fundamental human rights, all is not well for the American people." The reason is very simple. Certain functionaries of the United States government have been exercising a "back door' end run around the 13th amendment and its protection against involuntary servitude. This "back door" is in the form of "treaties" made or which shall be made; under the authority of the Constitution. The abuse of Law is taking place not so much in the Treaty itself; but rather in the dereliction of these treaties to comply with the "guiding language" - "under the authority of the Constitution". Apparently the government has reasoned that since the Constitution has been SUSPENDED pursuant to Senate Report 93-549; then the guiding principles embodied in that document are also SUSPENDED and its open season on the Rights of the American People. Petitioners have cited statute after statute; regulation after regulation; Rule after Rule; that has been totally ignored without explanation or comment. Yet these Rules, statutes and regulations say; this cannot be done; yet it is. If the Rule of Law is so capricious and whimsical at the mere assertion of government; than surely we have tyranny and slavery, not fundamental freedom and Liberty. The official Record and Docket of the proceedings of this instant matter speaks volumes of the miscarriage of justice and utter disregard for the Rule of Law in North Carolina. The deprivations of Due Process along with the corresponding non- compliance with procedures has resulted in nothing short of forced "servitude" on the property rights of Appellants. It matters not whether the government or a Quasi/public agent is forcing the exaction of Appellants property; as long as the component of "compulsion" is receiving the blessings and direction from an act of government or one of its instrumentalities." This court has the last "bite" at the apple of Justice. Will it be tyranny or will it be Liberty; that is the question. In all civilized government; the Courts are always the last bastion of Liberty. Remember the following: Declaration of Human Rights: "Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, Now, therefore, The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. Article 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any /other limitation of sovereignty. Article 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 30 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. REASON No. 5 The simple argument for (A), is either the government of the State has a contract with Congress, A.K.A. United States and their Constitution, which would prevent the happenings involved that caused the Complaint to issue; OR, we are at the mercy of being a people under conquest where the peace time parameters of the Constitution are simply ABOLISHED by a Treaty based organization implementing what ever is necessary thereby violating their oath to do justice and abdicating any position of the protectors of the people. REASON No. 6. The Supreme Court of North Carolina and the Public Utilities Commission both refused to consider evidence of law that the Federal Excise tax was actually terminated July 1, 1965 and Congressionally repealed by Public Law June 28, 1968. The evidence was submitted to both entities of North Carolina who had a duty to Rule on the evidence submitted since the opposing parties entered no evidence to support a contrary position. The evidence entered by Petitioners consisted of pages from the 4-1-97 edition of 26 CFR Subpart C-Communications Section 49.4251-1 (b) Termination of Tax on telephone service; 26 USC 4251 under STATAMEND- REPEAL by Pub. L. 90-364, title I, Sec.105 (b) (3), June 28, 1968, 82 Stat. 266; the Code of Federal Regulations Parallel Table of Authorities showing no citation on page 814 of 26 USC 4251 existing and no regulation. Since a repealed law that is being unlawfully applied has no standing, even if Federal, it can be struck down by any State and North Carolina State agencies (Supreme Court and PUC). Since both entities failed to do so they violated the Fundamental rights of Petitioners in the "taking" of property without due process of law. This is stated in the evidence proffered to both agencies which came from the Department of the Treasury Part 600, Section 601.106 (f) (1), which states, "An exaction by the U.S. Government, which is not based upon law, statutory or otherwise, is a taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." Since Petitioner's have no rights given to them under either Constitutions as they are not privy to either contract as members, they move forward under the Fundamental Rights Doctrine. As to the "B" part of Question Six--In spite of the fact that IF the federal excise was not repealed, it still would not apply to Plaintiff/Appellants. The Statute at Large eliminates the codified statute when there is a discrepancy and the Court must set aside all codes. The following proves this point of law. Statutes at Large, March, 1897 To 1899, Vol. XXX, Fifty-Fifth Congress, Sess. II. Chapter 448. An Act To provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes. Page 460 Telephone messages: It shall be the duty of every person, firm, or corporation owning or operating any telephone line or lines to make within the first fifteen days of each month a sworn statement to the collector of internal revenue in each of their respective districts , stating the number of messages or conversations transmitted over their respective lines during the preceding month for which a charge of fifteen cents or more was imposed, and for each of such messages or conversations the said, person, firm or corporation shall pay a tax of one percent: Provided, That only one payment of said tax shall be required, notwithstanding the lines of one or more persons, firms, or corporations shall be used for the transmission of each said messages or conversations. The intent of Congress was very clear that no private man was required to pay the federal excise on telephones, only the "persons, firms and corporations," i.e. private utility companies, regardless of how the codified statutes are written. When an excise can no longer be passed on, the last holder to pay, it becomes a direct tax on that holder and is no longer an excise. Especially when the genesis of the tax is only on those items mentioned in the 1939 Statutes at Large. Further confirmation comes from the Statutes at Large of the 1939 Income Tax, in Vol. 53 Part 1, approved February 10, 1939, in Public Act No.1 of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, that the subject of the excise is not applied to the private man because he deals in no articles or commodities as does the Private Public Utilities. Speech is what is being taxed in violation of the prohibition in The First Article of the Bill of Rights, and has been taxed when the Public Utilities started taking advantage and charging private people an excise tax on their speech, which is against all constitutional parameters, whether in time of war, national emergency or time of peace and against the Intent of Congress in the Statutes at Large. This Excise tax is cited as "unjust enrichment" as described in the Statutes at Large Public Act No. 1. Page 112. SUBCHAPTER D-- UNJUST ENRICHMENT Sec 700. TAX ON NET INCOME FROM CERTAIN SOURCES. Page 115. (j) As used in this section-- (1) The term "Federal excise tax"
means a tax or exaction with respect to the sale, lease, manufacture,
production, processing, ginning, importation, transportation, refining, recovery,
or holding for sale or other disposition, of commodities or articles, provided
for by any Federal statute, whether valid or invalid, if denominated
a "tax" by such statute. A Federal excise tax shall be deemed
to have been imposed with respect to an article if it was imposed with
respect to (or with respect to the processing of) any commodity or other
article, from which such article was processed. It is impossible for the use of a phone conversation, speech, to be classed as an article processed as a commodity by a private man, who, is not defined as the "person," "firm," or "corporation" to whom Congress stated the excise tax applies. What Petitioner's have are Fundamental Rights that the Constitutions state can not be deprived by either Congress or State Legislature unless Petitioners consent and Petitioners do not and have not consented to voluntary servitude thereby invoking the involuntary servitude prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment. Let us not forget; Lack of full disclosure is equated with Fraud. Supra Since all the complained Excise charges are being forced upon Petitioners by alleged statute, the Congress and State Legislature violated their prohibitions mandated to them by the Thirteenth Amendment which denies Petitioner's Fundamental Rights given to mankind by the Creator, which we all acknowledge as men and reinforced in every state's constitution preamble. REASON No. 7 The Constitution for North Carolina specifically states at Article II, Section 21; "Style of Acts. The style of the acts shall be: "The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:". Both the NC Relay and State tax statutes state: "The General Assembly hereby declares". "The starting point in any endeavor to construe a Statute is always the words of the Statute itself; unless Congress has clearly indicated that its intentions are contrary to the words it employed in the Statute, this is the ending point of interpretation." Fuller v. United States 615 F. Supp. 1054 (D.C. Cal 1985), West's Key 188 quoting Richards v. United States 369 US 1, 9, 82 S. Ct. 585, 590, 7 L. Ed. 2d. 492 (1962). Petitioner's apply this same ruling to the Constitution of North Carolina and proceeding to the charges in question on the State level we find the sales tax at, N.C.G.S. § 105-120. Franchise or privilege tax on telephone companies. (a) Tax. -- An annual franchise or privilege tax is
imposed § 105-164.4. Tax imposed on retailers.
(4c) The rate of six and one-half percent (6 ½%)applies to the gross receipts derived from providing toll telecommunications services or private telecommunications services as defined by G.S. 105-120(e) that both originate from and terminate in the State and are not subject to the privilege tax under G.S. 105-120. Any business entity that provides these services is considered a retailer under this Article. There is no mention of Petitioners as consumers liable for a sales tax. Proceeding to the 911 statute we find; § 62A-2. Legislative purposes. The General Assembly declares it to be in the public interest to provide a toll free number through which an individual in this State can gain rapid, direct access to public safety aid. The number shall be provided with the objective of reducing response time to situations requiring law enforcement, fire, medical, rescue, or other public safety service. (1989, c. 587.) Proceeding to the next statute which is the NC Relay charge statute we find identical wording; § 62-157. Dual party relay system. Therefore, as can be clearly seen under strict constitutional construction and statutory construction, the statutes do not meet fundamental constitutional parameters, because to do so the statutes would be declared unconstitutional because they are basically a grant of charity in the NC Relay statute. Further, as a Police Power statutes, there is absolutely no evidence to support the declared purpose of the declaration :that is, providing a more rapid and direct response; than could be achieved by less non constitutional means. Therefore the statutes are mere declarations having no force of a properly enacted statute which voids all its charges and makes it voluntary rather than mandatory. The State tax, if charged to Petitioner (consumer), being a sales tax, is a tax on speech in violation of the First Article of the Bill of Rights regarding speech and of Article 1, Section 14 of the North Carolina constitution because the time spent talking is what is being charged (taxed). Reason No.8 North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 62 titled " Public Utilities" encompasses the policy and legislative intent regarding the proper role and duties of the Agency known as the Public Utilities Commission. This chapter is 134 pages long at single space 8-1/2 x 11" standard bond size paper. No where within all this verbiage can one find the straightforward definition of one of the most important legal terms used throughout that Chapter. To avoid confusion, the exact term I am speaking of is comprised of the two words "rate case". Why is a term of such legal significance NOT DIRECTLY and CLEARLY defined under the controlling definitions Section of N.C.G.S. 62-3? That particular term will not be found by straightforward search. What "we do find" within this definitions section is a definition of the term "rate"......without its adjoining word "case". N.C.G.S. 62-3(24): "Rate" means - "EVERY compensation, CHARGE, fare, TARIFF, schedule, toll, rental, and classification, or any of them, demanded, observed, CHARGED or COLLECTED by ANY PUBLIC UTILITY, for ANY SERVICE product or commodity OFFERED by it to the PUBLIC, and any rules, regulations, practices or contracts affecting any such compensation, charge, fare, tariff, schedule, toll, rental or classification." All caps spelling is included by myself as emphasis to important words to be referenced later. The word "case" is not singularly defined anywhere within this statute. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to give it its generally accepted meaning from Black's Law 7th. edit (pg. 206,): to wit:.......... " A proceeding, action, suit , or controversy at Law or in Equity." Our Complaint lodged in the first instance at the P.U.C. level clearly falls within that definition as a proceeding in controversy, when the Respondents "joined issue" by Answer on 12/28/98. The issues raised by Complainants had to do with various "charges" and fees "billed" to Petitioners on their phone bills which for reasons given elsewhere in this Brief; are challenged for their propriety as well as lawfulness given the legislative history of said charges and the original language in the subscribers agreement/s of said telephone carriers, AT&T and Sprint Telecom. It is an uncontrovertible fact that should Complainants prevail in this rate matter, the financial impact upon all telephone carriers nationwide will have significant repercussions upon their financial accounting reports as well as their economic viability. Registered CPA's would call this as events substantially affecting a companies "rate of return"! Understanding this fact to be self evident, maybe we have another piece in the puzzle to defining exactly what is meant by the term "rate case"? N.C.G.S. 62-81 gives this further guidance at 62-81, it says: (a) "All cases or proceedings, declared to be "or" properly classified as general rate cases under G.S. 62-137, "or" any proceeding which substantially affects any utility's overall level of earnings or rate of return, shall be set for trial or hearing by the Commission, which trial or hearing shall be set to commence within six months of the institution or filing thereof, and all such cases or proceedings shall be tried or heard and decided, with issuance of a final order, by the Commission within nine months of the institution or filing thereof."***" (b) Proceeding to G.S. 62-137 we finally have our definition for what a rate case is per G.S. 62-81. At 62-137, it says: (a) In setting a hearing on rates (defined at G.S. 62-3(24)) upon its own motion, upon Complaint, or upon application of a public utility, the Commission shall declare the "scope" of the hearing by determining whether it is to be a general rate case, under G.S. 62-133***" First of all, it says there are three methods that qualify for getting to the hearing stage. Mr. Coombs and Mr. Burge qualify by option # 2..,a Complaint ! And, if one reads our Brief, they will see that in fact a "hearing" was scheduled but immediately canceled as soon as we instituted our first set of Discovery questions upon the Defendants. Further, G.S. 62-137 states that a "rate case"(*) is one which is a hearing on "rates." Referring back to G.S. 62-3(24) for the definition of what constitutes a "Rate"[above]. G.S. 62-137 just told us that G.S. 62-133 will tell us "whether {our case} is a RATE CASE pursuant to G.S. 62-133.! G.S. 62-133 - Nowhere defines the term " Rate Case".,instead.,G.S. 63- 133 is captioned as : HOW RATES [are] FIXED. It merely states the parameters how the PUC goes about setting the "rate of return" for selected utilities. However, G.S. 62-133(e) does give us the best evidence yet as to that elusive term RATE CASE where it states, "the fixing of a rate of return shall not bar the fixing of a different rate of return in a subsequent proceeding." It therefore follows from this clause, that any {proceeding} hearing premised on the definition of the term "rate" at G.S. 62-3(24) - and affecting the rate of return of the defendant Utility, - would seem to satisfy the standard required for a case to be considered a Rate Case. This is precisely the basis, reasoning and logic supporting Complainant/s determination that we have proceeded correctly throughout our filings. By canceling our deserved and clearly qualified hearing however, the PUC, directly and by artifice, hid the facts which would have established beyond any reasonable doubt, to the public as well as the courts, that our case was indeed a general rate matter as described at 62-3(24); 62-81; 62- 137 and 62-133 above. The PUC deliberately misapplied the criteria established by 62-81. For example, the Commission can DECLARE a matter as a rate matter; "or" a matter can QUALIFY as a ":general rate matter" simply as a matter of Law and definition. 62-81(a) does say, "**** " or "ANY proceeding which will substantially affect ANY utility's overall level of earnings or rate of return***"SHALL be set for trial or hearing ? The Complainants have challenged the PUC and the Respondents to offer any evidence to the contrary, or to offer verbiage that rebuts the direct reading of the statutes in question; and not a single piece of rebuttal evidence has been offered to bolster the Respondents defense to their position. Therefore,as detailed above, our case does satisfy the prime criteria establishing our complaint as a general rate case, clearly intended within the mandate of the Utilities statute. If this weren't enough to make a prima facie showing to this Court and all tribunals that we are proceeding correctly; let us not forget the Maxim of Law as to "vagueness' - in the construction and implementation of a Statute. In statutory construction, the meaning of nebulous or ill defined terms of art will always be the responsibility of the AUTHOR of the language of the statute and/or the Agency charged with adopting appropriate Regulation clarifying its intended meaning. In the absence of such IMPLEMENTING REGULATION clarifying such terminology, the language in dispute will always be construed LIBERALLY in FAVOR of the one challenging its designated application. Therefore, Was the North Carolina Supreme Court correct in summarily dismissing our action absent any presentation by the defendants or affirmative showing to the contrary; that our arguments were invalid? Complainants say " No". The N.C. Supreme Court was clearly in Error. Absent any alternative definition of the legal term " RATE CASE" ? Was the North Carolina Supreme Court in Error, for adopting or PRESUMING to adopt a legal term CRUCIAL to their subject matter and PROCEDURAL jurisdiction statute WITHOUT any foundation argument or responsive Briefs to the contrary? PETITIONERS STATE EMPHATICALLY ,YES! The evidence just described above, from a literal reading of the statutes, shows unequivocally that the PUC acted outside its discretion and conspired, with the carriers, through THEIR dereliction of DUTY; to squelch our attempt to seek a remedy under law for a violation of the North Carolina constitution as well as several statutes both State and federal. The Supreme Court merely joined this conspiracy probably for political purpose and also probably due to the "treaty" aspects of the issues in question. Absent "any" statements of Fact or Conclusions of Law to give insight into the epiphany and minds of the justices; we have only logic and common sense to direct our conclusions. The law placed a duty upon the PUC, to hold a trial type hearing where witnesses could be examined and testimony taken and THEN and ONLY then, to make a FINAL order according to law. Clearly this was not done. The WHY, concerning the PUC's action is easy to uncover at G.S. 62- 133, when we find the language that INDICTS the P.U.C. and exposes the real reason they abruptly canceled the scheduled hearing Mr. Coombs requested as soon as it was abundantly clear that THEY were about to be exposed for their dereliction of DUTY; (a) that language reads as follows: "***the "rates" established under this Chapter, [[by the Commission]], shall be deemed just and reasonable and any rate charged by any public utility different from those so established shall be deemed unjust and unreasonable. Provided, however, that upon petition filed by any interested person, and a hearing thereon, if the Commission shall find the rates or charges collected to be [[other than the rates established by the Commission,]] and to be unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, the Commission may enter an order awarding such petitioner and all other persons in the same class a sum equal to the difference between such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential rates or charges and the rates or charges found by the Commission to be just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory and non preferential, to the extent that such rates or charges were collected within two years prior to the filing of such petition.
The Commission MUST first FIND that the RATES charged were different from those AUTHORIZED by the Commission itself to be unjust and unreasonable, ONLY AFTER a "hearing" held to establish those facts. In other words, the Commission must sit in judgment of itself and first determine that the phone companies were charging rates other than those authorized by them. They would have to admit that their staff was negligent in their duty to the public by not identifying the improper procedure followed in setting these rates in the first place. They, P.U.C., wasn't about to make that admission for all the people of North Carolina to see. This presents a clear conflict of interest and a totally biased PUC and Supreme Court of North Carolina. This, among other important Executive reasons, is why the PUC found it easier and less embarrassing to "bury" our case in their [ out box ]. The language of G.S. 62-133 however, makes it crystal clear that the Commission was under a DUTY to "SET OUR CASE FOR HEARING" BEFORE any decision was made as to the propriety of the challenged charges were ever DECIDED. There simply can be no further doubt as to that fact. The damage to Petitioners is obvious. Mr. Coombs and Mr. Burge were denied fundamental Due Process and fairness and any semblance of Equal Justice for they were denied any opportunity to "plead" their case before dismissing.", and any opportunity to Civil Discovery which surely was about to uncover further wrongdoing on the part of Respondents and the Commission itself. This was not corrected by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, thereby furthering the damages and violating due process and justice and fairness further, when Defendants never appeared yet the Court dismissed, going against all principles of law. REASON No. 9 N.C.G.S. 62-73 and Agency Rule (R1-19) are controlling on this matter and Section 73 clearly states: to wit: §62-73. Complaints against public utilities. Complaints may be made by the Commission on its own motion or by any person having an interest, either direct or as a representative of any persons having a direct interest in the subject matter of such complaint by petition or complaint in writing setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public utility, including any rule, regulation or rate heretofore established or fixed by or for any public utility in violation of any provision of law or of any order or rule of the Commission, or that any rate, service, classification, rule, regulation or practice is unjust and unreasonable. Upon good cause shown and in compliance with the rules of the Commission, the Commission shall also allow any such person authorized to file a complaint, to intervene in any pending proceeding. The Commission, by rule, may prescribe the form of complaints filed under this section, and may in its discretion order two or more complaints dealing with the same subject matter to be joined in one hearing. Unless the Commission shall determine, upon consideration of the complaint or otherwise, and after notice to the complainant and opportunity to be heard, that no reasonable ground exists for an investigation of such complaint, the Commission shall fix a time and place for hearing, after reasonable notice to the complainant and the utility complained of, which notice shall be not less than 10 days before the time set for such hearing. (1949, c. 989, s. 1; 1963, c. 1165, s. 1.) Mr. Burge clearly has a DIRECT interest in |