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71st Congress, 3d Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . House
Document No. 825, Vol. III
Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations
of the
United States
1930
(In Three Volumes)
Volume III
United States
Government Printing Office Washington: 1945
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102
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1930, VOLUME III
this loan is payable to the Reich in two tranches, one of a face amount
of $50,000,000 on August 30, 1930, and a second of a face amount of $75,000,000
on May 29, 1931. The syndicate will place the proceeds of the first tranche,
in April 1930, and of the second tranche middle of June 1930, at the disposal
of the Reich. The members of the international syndicate will be announced
later. As will be recalled, the proceeds of the match loan were to serve
for the reduction of the current debt of the Reich. Through a discounting
of the proceeds of this loan the Reichsfinanz will immediately effect this
reduction of the current indebtedness. Aside from the foregoing, the debt
reduction will be carried out as provided the law of December 24, 1929,
which is to be effected. In the course of the fiscal year 1930-31 through
new taxes and economies in the amount of $450,000,000 Reichsmarks."
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862.51/2871
Mr. Thomas W. Lamont of J.P. Morgan & Co. to the Under
Secretary
of State (Cotton)
New York, March 27, 1930
DEAR Joe:
. . . . . . .
GERMAN ANNUITY BONDS
As I told you over the telephone: the first and probably
the only issue which will be offered simultaneously in the markets of the
world is scheduled to be sufficient in amount to an effective $300,000,000.
Depending, therefore, upon the interest and the discount, if any, the par
value of the issue $300,000,000 as a minium and perhaps a very few million
above that as a maximum. Of the $300,000,000, $200,000,000 is for the
of the creditors and, of course, to go to Germany's general credit with
them, and $100,000,000 is to go to the German Government for immediate
requirements in connection with the German Railways and the German Post
Office requirements. This latter strikes us as excellent, because engaging
the further co-operation of Germany.
The total issue will be divided up into various
tranches, each issue to be made in the currency of the country where the
tranche is issued. It is expected that be French, British, Belgian, Italian,
American, Swedish, Dutch, Swiss, German and possible Japanese tranches.
Over there they have had an idea that the American market might do the
largest share. Our own idea has been that the American market ought
not to take an in excess of that which the French market takes and not
to exceed an amount sufficient to yield $100,000,000. Our mind is not
closed
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GERMANY
103
on the matter, because we have not heard all the facts of the situation,
which will be communicated to me when I reach Paris. But this is the way
we feel at present. The other markets, with the exception of the which
will take a substantial amount, will be rather limited in amounts which
they are able to take. But it is important to have Germany herself somewhere
in the picture as a subscriber to the bonds.
There are several reasons why we think it is important
that the investment market should share substantially in this operation.
One is that this is the final liquidation of the
War so far as the settlement of great economic questions is concerned,
and obviously it is greatly to the interest of American trade to have this
great question settled.
Second, it was a cardinal principle of the American
delegates at the Conference to urge that Germany be taken effectively out
of receivership; that the heavy mortgage liens upon her railways and industries
be abolished, and that she be put upon her honor to carry out her obligations.
We feel that in this way the good will of her people could be best
engaged. The present plan carries out that principle which is, if I may
call it so, an American one and was well recognized and appreciated at
the time by the German delegates.
If we should fail to offer a substantial portion
of the bonds here, the American investment market would, in any event,
because of the keen demand for bonds, buy a large quantity of these bonds.
Obviously it would be much better to have them buy dollar bonds to have
them buy foreign currency bonds, because by such an arrangement we should
gain all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of a direct issue.
If you find by April 4th or 5th
that there is going to be serious difficulty at Washington, then that fact
should be privately communicated to me through our firm here. My partners
will keep you posted as the situation develops on the other side. I shouldn't
think that active negotiation itself and the figuring out of prices and
terms would be undertaken much before the middle or third week in April.
Sincerely yours,
T. W. LAMONT
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862.51/2873
W, Randolph Burgess, Assistant Federal Reserve Agent of the
Reserve Bank of New York, to the Acting Secretary of State
[New York] March 31, 1930.
Dear Mr. SECRETARY: Confirming my telephone conversation I am enclosing
a copy of a cable we have just received from Governor Harrison dated March
29, together with a copy of our cable to him dated March 38
528037C45C13
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104
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1930, VOLUME III
In view of your suggestion that the date of Governor Harrison=s
return, which we expect to be about April 6, may be too late for his further
views on this question to be of value, we are to-day cabling him suggesting
that he send any further amplification he wishes by cable.
Very truly yours,
W. RANDOLPH BURGESS
[Enclosure 1--Telegram]
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to the Governor of the
Bank
(Harrison)
March 28, 1930
No. 15. J.P. Cotton would like your opinion concerning amount
of American participation which would be desirable in any early reparation
bond issue either as to absolute amount or proportion of total. He is desirous
of getting your views before your return. For your guidance our opinion
follows:
"There are evidently two questions involved first, the amount of
such bonds our market will take, and second, the question of public and
political reaction. As to the first we believe our market, could now absorb
not more than $100,000,000 if the issue is made attractive.
The second point has been accentuated by recent
speeches of Louis T. McFadden (22) and there is undoubtedly considerable
suspicion and opposition by reason of which it would appear desirable that
our participation should be not over one-third of the total and should
be well within the absorptive power of our market. On the other hand
it would seem that for us to take too small a participation would cause
unfavorable European reaction."
Crane
[Enclosure 2--Telegram]
The Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Harrison)
to the Bank
March 29, 1930
No. 14. For Crane. Your No. 15. My views definitely expressed
to Emile Moreau,(23) Gates W. McGarrah, (24) S. Parker Gilbert, N. Dean
Jay (25) and others in light of all aspects of situation are briefly that
American participation should not exceed 1/3 of total, should not exceed
$100,000,000 in any event and if possible should be no greater than French
participation. In general Gates W. McGarrah and N. Dean Jay agree with
this formula as does even Emile Moreau in principle though latter feels
it not possible for French to take more than $80,000,000. Anxious to amplify
these views on my return.
Harrison
22. Representative
Louis T. McFadden, of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Banking and Currency
Committee.
23. French banker
and statesman, later Governor of the Bank of France
24. President
of the Bank for International Settlements.
25.Partner
of Morgan & Cl*, Paris.
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GERMANY
105
862.51/2872
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Cotton)
[Washington] April 4, 1930.
Mr. Ogden Mills of Treasury, Governor Young of the
Federal Board, Mr. Roland Boyden (26) and myself. Discussed Mr. Lamont's
letter to me of March 27th and Mr. W. Randolph Burgess' letter
to me of March 31st, with their enclosures.
It seemed to be the unanimous opinion of those present,
subject with Mr. Robinson,(27) that they were willing to recommend that
some participation in the proposed German loan be permitted but that consent
to such participation should not be condition on any political agreement
of any kind or any agreement for change in the Young Plan and that
roughly, participation of not more one-third seemed desirable.
The point at which there was any doubt was as to the function of the
Federal Reserve Board in acting on the final form of application when it
was made by the Reserve Bank. It was suggested that the function of the
Reserve Board in that particular was to be confined to the purely banking
aspects of the situation and that suggestion seemed to find favor. The
parties interested will be informed of and final action.
J.P. Cotton
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862.51/2879
J. P. Morgan & Co. to the Under Secretary of State (Cotton)
New York, May 21, 1930.
Dear Mr. SECRETARY: Confirming Mr. Lamont's statement to you on the
telephone, the German government proposes to issue, to the Young Plan
and the Hague Agreements,(27a) an amount of 35 year 5 1/2% bonds sufficient
to produce approximately $300,000,000 in effective proceeds; two-thirds
of the loan represents the capitalization annuities payable to the creditor
powers and one-third money borrowed by the German government for the
German Railways and Posts. The loan is to be international and it is
proposed to offer it in the United States, France, Great Britain, Switzerland,
Holland, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Germany in separate tranches in the
currencies of those countries respectively. The amounts of the
26. Formally unofficial representative of the United States with
the Reparation Commission
27. Presumably Henry M. Robinson of Los Angeles, California,
unofficial adviser to President Hoover27a. Great Britain, Cmd. 3484,
Miscellaneous No. 4 (1930): Agreements Concluded at the Hague Conference,
January 1930.
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FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1930~ VOLUME III
several tranches have not yet been definitely determined, but it is
not expected that the amount offered here will exceed $100,000,000 par
amount of bonds or $85,000,000 effective proceeds; and it is expected that
a substantially equivalent amount will be issued in France.
I am [etc.]
[Signature illegible]
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862.51/2879
The Secretary of State to J.P. Morgan & Co.
Washington, May 22, 1930
Sirs: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
May 21, regarding the contemplated issue of bonds of the German Government.
The Department does not desire to interpose objection
to the proposed financing.
Very truly yours, H.L. Stimpson
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AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE DISCHARGE OF GERMANY'S WAR INDEBTEDNESS
TO THE UNITED STATES, SIGNED JUNE 28, 1930 (28)
462.00R294/785
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Mellon)
Washington, June 13 1930
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the recent oral
request of Mr. Redpath of your Department for an expression of this Department's
view as to whether the proposed agreement between the United States and
Germany for the settlement of the indebtedness of the German Reich to the
United States on account of the awards of the Mixed Claims Commission,
United States and Germany, and the costs of the United States army of occupation,
and the notes to be exchanged between the two Governments at the time of
the execution agreement, if signed by the German Ambassador under the power
of attorney given to him by his Government, will constitute valid and binding
international obligations of the German Government. The agreement provides
in paragraphs numbered 9 and 10 as follows:
9. Compliance With Legal Requirements.----- Germany
and the United States, each for itself, represents and agrees that the
execution and delivery of this Agreement have in all respects been duly
authorized and that all acts, conditions, and legal formalities which should
have been completed prior to the making of this Agreement have been completed
as required by the laws of Germany and of the United States respectively
and in conformity therewith.
______________________________________
28. For previous correspondence concerning this agreement, see Foreign
Relations,
1929, vol. II, pp. 1083 ff.
COMMENTS:
The above shows how the private power brokers, J.P. Morgan
& co., who stand to gain more, money wise, are involved in these convention
talks. The average American cannot do what J.P. Morgan and others can as they
control many aspects of the banks and Congress. You can see that the speeches
of McFadden had an impact when they said the suspicions of the American people
would be raised if the previous agreed amounts were to be loaned.
You can also see that the Young Plan is of critical importance.
All throughout these Foreign Relations Books The Young Plan is mentioned as
well as the Hague Agreements. However, these three books do not go into detail
what these Plans are. I am sure you can read what is happening here with the
United States being the sugar daddy to the world. This is only one country that
is being loaned money. The Constitution does not provide that the United States
take care of the world. But the big businesses, having holdings in many of the
countries, were instrumental in seeing these loans were given in order to increase
their profits. You, however, were left holding the debt as was stated in 1933,
when Congressman McFadden stated that the entire property of all
Americans was used to back these loans. Simply stated, the Internal Revenue
Service is the collecting agents for the Federal Reserve, who controls all banking,
and must sop up the debt obligations to pay the bankers who loaned all this
money. Further on I will show how the IRS is more private than you think.
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